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Reports
MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT
As part of tile annual meeting of the :1odern
Language Association of America in rtouston,
December 27-30, 1980, a session will be
held entitled "Animal Rights and welfare,
and Human Ethics, in Twentieth Century
Literature." The session will meet in
the Arbor Room at the Hyatt Regency in
nouston on December 29, from 3:30 4:45 p.m. Chairperson will be Richard
110rgan, coordinator of WJ:iters for Animal
Rights. For further information, contact
Dr. 110rgan at: English Departr.lent,
Box 19l20A, East Tennessee State University,
Johnson City, TN 37614.'

THE ETHICS OF THE USE OF ANIMALS IN RESEARCH
Bates College hosted a conference on March
21-22, 1980, entitled: "The Ethics of the Use
of Animals in Research." The gathering, held
in Lewiston, Maine was made possible through
an anonymous gift by a Maine philanthropist.
The symposium met in two sessions, one on
philosophic and one on practical considerations.
After critically reviewing several positions
on the ethics of our treatment of animals,
philosopher Tom Regan, of North Carolina State
university, argued his own evolving thesis
based on concept of rights. Launching from
Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriouslv, particu
particu
larly the nonon that "indl.viaua! rignts
'trump' the rights of the group", Regan
described several alternative principles wnere
tnat trumping ought to give way. These
would provide practical guidelines for the
resolution of conflicting claims, instances
where an individual's rights would be sacri
sacri
ficed for the sake of the group. An indi
indi
vidual, human or non-human, possesses rights
if he is "the subject of a life, for better
or for worse." The primacy of individual
rights over those of the group, Regan asserts,
places the burden of justification on those
wnD would abridge an individual's rights.
The researcher mus t show,,,hy the subj ee t of
an experiment, if he is an individual with
rights, must give them up for the sake of a
group.
In his formal response, Mark Okrent, of the
Philosophy Department at Bates ColleGe,
charged Regan to further unpack his criterion
for possession of rights. He argued tnat
"being a subject" implies self-consciousness,
a criterion that would exclude a most non
non
human animals--Washoe's "me Washoe" notwith
notwith
standing. Agreeing that this was a critical
problem
for his position, Regan referred
to an ability co remember as a further
tentative explication DE "subj ect." .'lemory
is not yet self-awareness, while it is more
than sentience.

In a second formal response to Regan, David
Kolb (Pnilosophy Department, Bates College)
suggested that we "stop talking about animal
r~3hts and start talkin:; about anit!!al values."
Rl.ghts are the wrong foundation, in part
because they are either possessed or not.
Values come in degree and allow us to "move
down the hierarchy of animals" in a search
for alternative methods of research.
Speaking more directly to the question of
practice, Tom Wolfle (National Institute of
Health) offered the weignt of a brief history
of biomedical breakthroughs to assert the
indispensability of animals to research.
Given that this role for the animal is critical
to contemporary science, Wolfle is concerned
with the adequacy of animal care. As a
veterinarian and an animal behaviorist he
systematically assesses their species-~pecific
needs, Distinguis~ing between stress and
distress, and holding the former to be a
necessary part of life, he attempts to con
con
trol the animal's distress. Partly based on
a reading of Hans Selye, he would achieve
this by "providing w!!ll-defined controlled
stress so that the animal is better equipped
to cope with his later life in the laboratory."
In,a carefully argued response, Deborah Mayo
(Phl.losophy Department, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University) demonstrated
the incompatibility of this adaptation
training to the laboratory, with concern for
the animal's natural needs. Socialization
to the stress of the laboratory begs the
ethical question of the limits of the conditions
to which the animal should be required to
ada~t.
Mayo also offered a number of ar~u
ments against the "scientific justification
of animal experiments." She held that
invalid research arises from the artificiality
of laboratory conditions and of laboratory.
bred animals, from the presence of inter
inter
species differences, and from the confusion
of background with experimental variables.
Providing high contrast to wolfle, both sub
sub
sta~tively and stylistically, Emmanuel Bernstein
del~vered an evocative and impassioned plea
tnat we lessen the amount of pain to which we
subject animals iu research. Bernstein's
position is that much research is redundant
and inapplicable; and, hence, tnat the pain
involved is unjustifiable. Taking the
research paradigm of learned helplessness
as an example, he tried to show that, while
the suffering of the dogs is considerable,
the phenomenon induced is not a valid
analogue to human depression. A clinical
psychologist in private practice (Saranac
Lak 7, New York), Bernstein proposed tne for
for
mat~on of groups within research disciplines
to act as animal advocates.
An animal requires "a "orld to be what it
is", <;>ffered John Cowgell, a doctoral candi
candi
date In the Zoology Department ~orth Carolina
State University, with a backg~ound both in
psychology and the philosophy of biology.
The harm that comes from our denial to the
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animal of its peculiar world is a broader
and more morally relevant criterion of abuse
than pain. All animals deserve such con
consideration, independent of any positive
prejudice toward those "star species"
apparently more like us. Our ethical obli
obligation to them ought not be founded in
human interest and empathy. but in our
recognition of their reality, integrity
and otherness.
Dr. Kenneth J. Shapiro
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